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One of the most controversial problems in the criminal law field during the
1960's has centered around the apparent contradiction between detailed reporting
of events about which there is pending criminal litigation and the sixth amend-
ment right of the criminally accused to a public trial "by an impartial jury."'
The impartiality of our criminal process is one of the most highly regarded of
American legal traditions. The difficulty in maintaining this tradition, in a society
permeated with every form of mass information media, of catering to a curious
public is one of the vital issues of our time. This comment is an attempt to look
at the overall problem and to study in depth the various curative proposals which
have been offered.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The problem of bias on the part of jurors as the result of prejudicial publi-
cations is not a new one. It was dealt with as early as 1807 by Chief Justice John
Marshall in the trial of Aaron Burr, where the chief justice commented:
Light impressions which may fairly be supposed to yield to the testi-
mony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair
consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to ajuror; but that those strong and deep impressions, which will close the
mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to them,
which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a
sufficient objection.2
The probable catalyst for the recent awareness of prejudicial publicity was
the Warren Report.3 In its investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy
the Warren Commission concluded that:
If Oswald had been tried for his murders of November 22, the effects
of news policy pursued by the Dallas authorities would have proven
harmful to both the prosecution and the defense.4
The Commission also admonished that "[t]he courtroom, not the newspaper or
television screen, is the appropriate forum in our system for the trial of a man
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
2. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (No. 14692g) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
3. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, N.Y. Times Edition, 213-224 (1964).
4. Id. at 220.
(538)
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accused of a crime." 5 The conclusions that the Warren Commission reached in
regard to the prejudicial tenor of the publicity surrounding the assassination of
President Kennedy seemed to foster new interest in the question of the effect
of publicity on the criminally accused's right to an impartial trial.
Of course, the assassination of a president is an extremely uncommon crime,
and in such a case the public must be informed as much as possible. In fact, the
problem of prejudicial publicity does not arise in any but the most unusual cases
involving only the most flagrant crimes.6 But, query, is it not as important that
our system of justice be able to deal as equitably with those rare occurrences
as with the routine case? Even in the case of the presidential assassination, Oswald's
rights could have been protected to a much greater degree.
We could have had statements that Lee Oswald, age so and so, resi-
dence so and so, a white man, had been arrested; that a committing
magistrate found probable cause to hold him for his murder; there was
no evidence that he was the agent of any conspiracy or organization,
foreign or domestic; that the investigation was proceeding; that he would
be brought to a speedy trial; counsel had been retained for him; and that
because of the requirements of due process of law, items of evidence in
the case could, of course, not be disclosed at this time.7
Publicity excesses were equally apparent in the case of Richard Speck.
News stories printed in the New York Times related that the suspect, Speck,
"apparently had attempted suicide", and that Speck had previous felony con-
victions. A statement of Superintendent of Police, 0. W. Wilson, that, "I feel
that we have enough information to be absolutely positive that this man is the
murderer,"s was also reported. Statements by the police included certain facts: that
Speck had left thirty-two finger prints at the murder scene, that the survivor, Miss
Amurao, had "made a positive identification from a National Maritime Union
passport-size picture . . . " that Speck had been known to use aliases, that he
was wanted in connection with a Dallas assault, and a detailed explanation of
how the FBI was able to identify the fingerprints left at the murder scene as
Speck's.9 One headline relating to Speck read: "Suspect Has a Prison Record And
Is Known as a Drifter."10 He was reported to be wanted in connection with
another murder involving a woman, and his exact movements were reconstructed
by the police from the time of the crime until his capture and, then, released to
5. Id. at 222.
6. One survey by the New York Times showed that out of 11,724 felonies
committed in New York City in January, 1965, only forty-one were reported in the
Daily News, which published the greatest amount of news concerning crime in
the New York area. Hearings on S. 290 Before the Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Rights and the Subcommittee on Improvement in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (1965).
7. Pointed out by Mel Wulf, Director, Legal Division, A.C.L.U., in a letter
dated February 13, 1964 to the Union's Due Process Committee.
8. New York Times, July 17, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
9. New York Times, July 17, 1966, at 54, col. 4.
10. New York Times, July 17, 1966, at 54, col. 7.
1969]
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newsmen." The complaints of Speck's attorney and various legal scholars as to
the prejudicial aspects of this publicity went largely unheeded.
Recent years have also witnessed new dimensions of case law on the subject
of pre-trial publicity. This indicates an increasing awareness by the courts that
the judicial processes are sometimes undermined by out-of-court publicity directed
toward pending criminal cases.12 Indeed, some of the most illustrative examples of
the prejudice done to criminal defendants can be taken from the facts of certain
Supreme Court cases. The circumstances surrounding the celebrated case of Dr.
Sam Sheppard are in point.13 Three months before the trial Sheppard was ex-
amined for more than five hours without counsel in a televised three-day inquest
held before several hundred people in a high school gymnasium. The jury list
was published and, as a result, all prospective jurors received phone calls from
persons expressing opinions as to his guilt. The press suggested that it was an
admission of guilt on the part of Sheppard when he hired a prominent criminal
lawyer. In Irvin v. Dowd14 opinions, not only as to defendant's guilt but even as
to what punishment he should receive, were solicited on public streets. Also,
Rideau v. Louisiana's is an excellent example of the prejudice that can be done
via the mass media. In that case a motion picture film with sound track was made
of an "interview" in the jail between the petitioner and a sheriff the day after
arrest. The film consisted of interrogation by the sheriff and admissions by the
accused. On three successive days this film was broadcast over the local television
station. It is reasonable to conclude that a sizable majority of all potential jurors
were, therefore, witnesses to defendant's confession (which would not have been
admissible in evidence), and yet the trial court refused a motion for change of
venue. The Supreme Court has recognized in these three cases, and others with
which they have dealt recently, that certain kinds of pre-trial publicity do endanger
the right of the criminally accused to an "impartial jury."
Pre-trial publicity is not an area of the law about which there is no dispute,
however. Many members of the mass media would minimize the adverse effects of
publicity on pending criminal litigation,10 and still others would emphasize the
beneficial aspect of the crime coverage of the news media. Some would stress the
point that the public has a certain right to know about crime and subsequent
penalty procedures against those who violate our laws. For example, William B.
11. New York Times, July 18, 1966, at 16, cols. 4, 5, and 6.
12. See especially Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1964); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966);
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 44 (1966).
13. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
14. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
15. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
16. The American Society of Newspaper Editors Bar-Press Committee claims
that there has been no competent demonstration of the effect of pre-trial publicity
on the minds of jurors. See No. 18 in a series of periodic publications by the
Freedom of Information Center, School of Journalism, University of Missouri.
[Vol. 34
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Monroe of N.B.C.17 would rebut some of the conclusions of the Warren Com-
mission:
The Warren Commission to the contrary, I will argue for the fastest,
widest dissemination all possible facts on any assassination of a President of
the United States. The need to know on the part of 190 million people, the
crucial importance of spreading assurance and preventing alarm, require
it. This nation, or any other, cannot be kept waiting for two, six or ten
months, until a trial is held, to find out for sure that the President was not
shot by an organized group whose plan might not yet be complete. The
people need to know immediately. They found out immediately after the
Kennedy assassination, and they weathered the shock without panic.'s
Some newsmen would argue news coverage is a benefit to the criminal defendant
in that violations of his rights might be discovered, thus leading to remedial
action. In the same law review article quoted above, Mr. Monroe quotes from
James Russell Wiggins, editor of the Washington Post, who wrote in Quill:
There is hardly a jurisdiction in this country in which newspapers
in the last fifty years have not discovered violations of the rights of
accused persons in the period preceding trial. Accused persons have been
kept secretly arrested, held without access to counsel or family, kept in the
custody of police without proper arraignment, solicited for confessions
without any warning as to their rights under the Fifth Amendment,
searched without warrant, questioned improperly and otherwise mal-
treated. These conditions much more menace the rights of accused persons
than pre-trial disclosures in the press .... Newspaper publicity is the best
way of treating these abuses in order to keep them at a minimum.19
A specific example of the positive good done an accused by pre-trial investiga-
tion and publicity by members of the press can be found in the circumstances of
the Gallashaw case in New York City. A young Negro boy was accused of shooting
another Negro boy during a racial disturbance. The prosecutor gave news media
an impression of an open and shut case. New York Times reporters, on their own,
found two prosecution witnesses who, upon questioning, substantially changed
their stories. As a result the boy was acquitted 2 0
In the discussion which follows concerning possible remedial action to
protect the impartiality of the criminal process from the effects of pre-trial
publicity, the assumption will be that such publicity can in fact prejudice the
minds of prospective jurors. Many psychologists would agree that the prospective
juror, as a result of dissemination of information by the press, enters the court-
room with an unshakeable image of the defendant.21 Throughout the discussion
17. Director of News, NBC Washington; Past President, Radio and Television
News Director Association.
18. Monroe, A Radio and Television Newsman's View, 11 VILL. L. REv. 687,
688 (1966).
19. Id. at 689.
20. Lower, The First Amendment Under Attack: A Defense of the People's
Right to Know, 42 NomE D~tm LAw, 896, 900 (1967). The case is not reported.
21. See generally WICYENS & MAYER, PSYcHOLoGy, 276-285 (1961). For an
excellent discussion of the effects of pre-trial publicity on the impartiality of the
4
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which is to follow, however, the reader should remain cognizant of the position
of the news media and of the interest of the public in being informed.
III. PROCEDURAL REMEDIES
A. Generally
There are certain things which a trial judge can, at his discretion, do to
alleviate possible prejudice as the result of publicity preceding criminal litiga-
tion. These are often classified as procedural remedies.2 2 Most of these are easy to
understand, do not involve constitutional questions, and do not raise great first
amendment controversies. Unfortunately, they are also ineffectual to a certain
extent. These procedural devices are important prospective remedies, and, indeed,
in the view of the absolutists on the Supreme Court, are the only remedies
because of the first amendment protection of the press. Justice Douglas, for
example, has said "the point is that our remedy for excessive comment by the
press is not the punishment of editors, but the granting of new trials, changes
in venue, or continuances to parties who are prejudiced."23
B. Change of Venue
Probably the most noted means of dealing with prejudice is to change the
location of the trial to a different venue, thereby allowing the criminal defendant
to have a trial in an area which has not been suffused with pre-trial publicity.
Ordinarily, the motion for change of venue must be accompanied by affidavits of
disinterested witnesses attesting to the community prejudice against the defendant.
This is true in Missouri. 24 Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, the defendant is entitled to a change in venue
if the court is satisfied that there exists in the district or division where
the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that
he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial at any place fixed by law for
holding court in that district.25
A change of venue can be an important tool to forestall the effects of
prejudice. However, this remedy has severe limitations. One problem which arises
is how many venue changes is the defendant to be entitled. This problem occurs
because the adverse publicity often follows the defendant to the new trial location.
One Supreme Court opinion has said the defendant is entitled to at least two such
changes and probably more.26 Also, these venue changes often cause delay in the
public, see Lofton, Justice and the Press: Communication Inside and Outside the
Courtroom, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 449 (1961).
22. See generally Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trial and the
Cause Celebre, 86 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810, 819-824 (1961).
28. The Public Trial and Free Press, 88 RocKY MT. L. Ruv. 1 (1960). See
also Black, The Bill of Rights, 85 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960).
24. § 545.490, RSMo 1959.
25. FED. R. Cmri. P. 21(a). Compare § 545.480, RSMo 1959, and Mo. Sup. Ct.
Rule 25.08.
26. Irvin v. Dowd, 866 U.S. 717 (1961).
[Vol. 34
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criminal litigation. The sixth amendment entitles the criminal defendant to a
"speedy trial" as well as to an "impartial jury." In addition, problems with sensa-
tional and prejudicial pre-trial publicity generally arise in the exceptional,
controversial, and exciting cases. In cases dealing with such persons as Oswald,
Ruby, Speck, Hoffa, Sheppard, Sirhan, Ray, and others like them there could be
no location found within the United States where the damaging publicity had
had no effect. This has led one federal court to find that a lower court did not
err in refusing to change the venue because the nationwide publicity involved
precluded the defendant from obtaining a fairer trial elsewhere.2r The question
also arises as to how much proof the defendant must present to convince the
court that a change of venue is proper. The trend, as enunciated in Rideau v.
Louisiana, seems to be to allow a new trial location where there has been a large
amount of adverse publicity without the requirement of proof of actual prejudice.28
C. Continuance
The technique of dealing with prejudice by postponing the trial until the
effects of publicity have diminished is perhaps less effective than change of venue.
It deprives the defendant of his right to a "speedy trial" and places a burden on
court dockets. It is also reasonable to suspect that time does not totally erase
from the memory of the prospective juror the publicity surrounding the crime,
or if it did, that the news media would not fail to remind him when the new
trial time approached. 29
Despite the doubtful effectiveness of either change of venue or continuance
as a means to deal with prejudicial publicity, the courts speak of these remedies
more often than any other. For instance, in State v. Crawford, a Missouri case,
the defendant's request for dismissal based on a claim of prejudice was refused.
The court held that the proper remedies were continuance and change of venue.30
D. Voir Dire Examination
Another procedural remedy is to allow the attorneys to question the jury
panel as to knowledge of news coverage concerning the defendant and as to
27. United States v. Lattimore, 112 F. Supp. 507 (D.D.C. 1953).
28. 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
29. United States v. Delaney, 199 F.2d 107, 114 (1st Cir. 1952), which states:
If the United States, through its legislative department, acting
conscientiously pursuant to its conception of the public interest, chooses
to hold a public hearing inevitably resulting in such damaging publicity
prejudicial to a person awaiting trial on a pending indictment, then the
United States must accept the consequence that the judicial department,
charged with the duty of assuring the defendant a fair trial before an
impartial jury, may find it necessary to postpone the trial until by lapse
of time the danger of the prejudice may reasonably be thought to have
been substantially removed.
See §§ 545.710-730, RSMo 1959, and Mo. Sup. Ct. Rule 25.08.
30. 416 S.W.2d 178, 184 (1967). See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
363 (1966).
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present opinions of guilt. In theory, this would seem an excellent solution. All
those who had been prejudiced by the publicity would disqualify themselves by
so indicating, and those remaining would compose an "impartial jury." However,
theory and practice are not always consistent. It is human nature that men do not
like to admit to an inability to be fair, and, indeed, they may often feel unbiased
having already reached certain conclusions about the evidence. Also, how are
challenges applied to remove prejudiced jurors? Should the defendant have a
challenge of right against all who admit to having read or heard certain news
stories? If so, it might be impossible to get a jury. Or should we disqualify only
those who admit to a preconceived opinion as to guilt? Again, it would be diffi-
cult to qualify a jury.3 ' The early standard, as pronounced in Reynolds v. United
States,3 2 was that a venireman need not be dismissed for cause even if admitting
a preconceived opinion as to the guilt of the accused if he can convince the court
that he will be able to disregard his opinion and render a verdict based on the
evidence presented to him. This standard is apparently still accepted by the
United States Supreme Court:
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to
the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut
the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to estab-
lish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impressions or opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court.33
This is, however, only a minimum standard, and the trial court does often excuse
those admitting preconceived opinions.3 4
Another reason why the effectiveness of voir dire examination must be
questioned is that recognized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in an opinion respecting
the denial of certiorari in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. If the defense
attorney exercises his right to examine jurors by asking if they have knowledge
of certain prejudicial news stories, "he would by that act be driving just one
more nail into James' coffin. We think, therefore, that remedy useless."3 5
31. In United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2nd Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868 (1963), a reversal was granted when of thirty-nine
veniremen questioned, thirty-one admitted having preconceptions, and fifty per-
cent of those jurors seated were of the initial opinion that the accused was guilty.
In Geagar v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903
(1963), a conviction was affirmed where more than 68 percent of 965 prospectivejurors questioned on their opinions as to the defendant's guilt admitted pre-
conceived inclinations as to his culpability, including two persons who actually
served. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), 90 percent of 370 prospectivejurors and two-thirds of those seated on the jury had an opinion as to guilt and
the accused was unsuccessful in challenging for cause several of the persons so
selected for the jury. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
32. 98 U.S. 145, 155-156 (1878).
33. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
34. See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 556-557 (1961).
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E. Sequestration of the Jury
Another procedural means of obtaining an impartial jury, aimed at possible
prejudice immediately before and during trial, is physically to shut off the jury
from the outside world so that it has no outlet to publicity sources. It is obvious
that this process is completely ineffective as a way to deal with opinions formed
long before trial by news stories dose in time to the crime charged. In other
words, the harm has been done far prior to the time this cure would be ad-
ministered.
There is also some evidence that sequestration itself can do prejudice o a
defendant's case. This was an argument made in United States v. Hoffa,3 6 where
the jury was quartered at Great Lakes Naval Station, at the discretion of the
trial judge, because of "recent charges of alleged jury tampering." This argument
by the defendants in that case was rejected, however.
F. Closed Preliminary Hearings
One of the recommendations of the American Bar Association Committee on
Fair Trial and Free Press would give the defendant the right to request that all or
part of any preliminary hearing be dosed to the public.3 7 The grounds for such
motion would be "that dissemination of evidence or argument adduced at the
hearing may disclose matters that will be inadmissable in evidence at the trial
and is therefore likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury."3s It is unclear whether this recommendation would place the burden of
proof for this claim on the defendant.
Closing preliminary hearings is one procedural technique of dealing with
36. 367 F.2d 698, 711-712 (7th Cir. 1966).
37. A.B.A. Advisory Comm. on Fair Trial and Free Press, Standards Relating
to Fair Trial and Free Press, (Tent. Draft 1966). These recommendations were
adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in February,
1968. The actual substantive proposals as adopted, minus text, may be found at
54 A.B.A.J. 347-351 (1968). See also from the tentative draft recommendations on
change of venue and continuance at pp. 8-10, sequestration at pp. 11-12, voir dire
at pp. 10-11, instructions at pp. 12-13, and mistrial at p. 14.
The standards relating to fair trial and free press, which are not self-
executing, consist of four sections. Part I relates to the conduct of lawyers
and proposes a new and enforceable canon of ethics relating to the
release of information to the news media. This recommendation will go
to the Association's Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards
for inclusion in the new Code of Professional Responsibility now under
preparation. It is recommended also to states and other jurisdictions
having canons of ethics. Part II proposes standards for law enforcement
officers, judges and judicial employees. These standards would be imple-
mented by departmental rules or regulations, rules of court, legislation or
canons of judicial ethics. Part III, recommendations relating to the
conduct of judicial proceedings in criminal cases, and Part IV, relating
to the contempt power, would be put into force through court rules,
statutes or judicial decision.
Reardon, The Fair Trial-Free Press Standards, 54 A.B.A.J. 343, 344 (1968).
Hereafter this draft will be cited as A.B.A. Rp.
38. Id. at 8.
1969]
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pre-trial publicity which would appear effective to a limited degree, i.e., to dis-
pose of prejudicial news stories arising out of the conduct of preliminary hear-
ings. There are inherent dangers, however. For one, the public should be told
about the conduct of our judicial system as it seeks to deal with crime. This is
a function of the "public trial" aspects of the sixth amendment just as protection
of the defendant is. Also, once an accused person has moved for a closed hearing,
he might fall prey to his own initiative and suffer wrongs of which the public and
press have no knowledge and, therefore, cannot move to redress. The right of
"public trial" is to insure fairness; once the public is closed off from a segment
of the judicial process, the rights of the defendant might be put in jeopardy.
Despite these dangers, however, this proposal merits future judicial consideration.
G. Waiver of Jury
The ABA Standards Relating to a Fair Trial and Free Press (better known as
the Reardon Report)39 also suggests that:
In those jurisdictions in which the defendant does not have an abso-
lute right to waive a jury in a criminal case, it is recommended that the
defendant be permitted to waive whenever it is determined that (1) the
waiver has been knowingly and voluntarily made, and (2) there is reason
to believe that, as a result of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial
material, the waiver is required to increase the likelihood of a fair trial 40
We are constitutionally guaranteed a right to a trial by an "impartial jury."
To say that this is impossible because of publicity before the trial and to substi-
tute a judge or judges is to demonstrate the adverse effect of pre-trial publicity.
Waiver of a jury is not a remedy for, but rather a manifestation of, the defects in
our system. To this writer, it seems pointless to enumerate a trial without a jury as
a cure for prejudiced jurors.
H. Mistrial4'
To grant a new trial where it appears that the jury was affected by out-of-court
news releases protects the defendant where he has already been tried by a biased
jury. However, this device delays his right to a "speedy trial," and does not
insure that a subsequent trial with a different jury will result in a fair verdict.
Indeed, at a later date prospective jurors might have been subjected to even more
extensive adverse publicity.
39. After the name of the Chairman of the reporting committee and Massa-
chusetts Judge, Paul C. Reardon.
40. A.B.A. REPy. 10.
41. In Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959), the Supreme Court
held that a mistrial should have been granted where information that the
defendant had previously been convicted of practicing medicine without a
license reached the jury via the newspapers, where defendant was convicted of
unlawfully dispensing certain drugs without a prescription from a licensed physi-
cian, and where the trial judge had excluded evidence of the prior conviction.
[Vol. 34
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I. Instructions to the Jury
Yet another possible procedural method of dealing with prejudice would
call upon the trial judge to admonish the jury to disregard all things pertaining
to the case at hand except those things actually presented during the trial pro-
ceedings. Such admonitions often instruct the juror "not to read, listen to, or
watch any news reports concerning this case while you are serving on this jury."42
Taking such form, instructions closely parallel, in effect, sequestration and are
subject to the same limitations as discussed under that topic. Instructions can
also be constructed to deal with prior prejudicial effect caused by reports on the
part of the news media. Failure to give such instructions can be held to constitute
reversible error.43 The assumption that prejudicial effects created by a deluge of
newscasting and sensational news coverage automatically can be placed aside
and forgotten at the suggestion of the judge is naive. Such instructions should be
given in order to appeal to the juror's conscience, but are unlikely to have any
momentous curative effect.
J. Habeas Corpus
Dr. Sam Sheppard first brought the prejudicial pre-trial publicity aspects
of his case before the courts by a writ of habeas corpus. For two reasons habeas
corpus is a very time consuming and expensive process. First, before habeas corpus
can be relied upon, every available direct state remedy must have been exhausted.
Second, every collateral attack possible under law must have been attempted.4 4 For
these reasons, it would appear to be unfair to expect a defendant who has been
wrongfully denied a fair trial as the result of publicity to rely upon a writ of
habeas corpus; many can afford neither the time nor the money.
K. Appellate Review
The most complex and probably the most effective of all procedural devices
in this area involves review of the trial court decision and the circumstances sur-
rounding it by courts of appellate jurisdiction. Appellate courts often consider the
presence or absence of all of the foregoing devices to determine whether the jury
was impartial. Earlier cases held that the appealing defendant must prove that
prejudice did exist at the time of trial 4 5 As a result, most of the cases reversed
have involved extreme prejudice that is obvious to the reviewing court.46 Courts
no longer need to find actual prejudice to have resulted from the pre-trial
publicity in order to reverse, however. In Rideau v. Louisiana47 the Supreme
42. A.B.A. REP. 13.
43. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
44. See Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause
Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rtv. 810, 823 (1961).
45. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 198 (1952).
46. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1962), and Irvin v. Dowd, 366
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Court did not even examine the voir dire to determine if there had been actual
prejudice, while in Estes v. Texas4 8 and Turner v. Louisiana,49 the Court cited
the "probability" and the "potentiality" of prejudice as grounds for reversal. It
seems to this writer that the following appraisal of the defects of appellate review
as a proper remedy for prejudicial pre-trial publicity is symbolic of the whole
area of procedural curative devices:
But we must remember that reversals are but palliative; the cure
lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its
inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that
will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interference. 50
All the procedural measures alluded to come into play only after the publicity
adverse to the defendant has come into existence. None attack the source of the
information or attempt to deter the publisher. The next two sections of this
article will attempt to deal with recommendations so aimed.
IV. CONSTRUCnVE CONTEMPT5 1
A. Introduction
The most fascinating and most controversial subject in the entire area of
pre-trial publicity concerns possible sanctions to be placed directly against the
news media to control the dissemination of pre-trial publicity. The discussion
herein shall treat the practice of contempt by publication as it has evolved and
exists in England, the history of constructive contempt in the United States, 52 and
the potentialities of contempt by publication as a useful remedy against prejudicial
pre-trial publicity in the United States today.
B. In England53
The 1756 case of King v. Almon 54 seems to be the chief judicial precedent for
constructive contempt in England. The action in that case was against a book-
seller who published a libel of Chief Justice Mansfield. It was also at about the time
48. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
49. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
50. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
51. This section is concerned with the possibility of putting sanctions
directly upon the news media to control prejudicial publicity. But note that
citations for contempt may also be issued against defense attorneys, prosecuting
authorities, and the police to control the sources of information. The succeeding
section will deal with that remedial problem.
52. Constructive contempt means that statements occurring outside the
courtroom are being punished. Direct contempt deals with statements made
before the court.
53. For an extended discussion of constructive contempt in England, see
Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial in English Law, 22 WAsH. Se LEE L. REv. 17
(1965. King v. Almon is an unpublished case whose facts are found in
J. WiLMOrr, NOTE or OPINION AND JUDGMENT 247 (1802). Wilmott was the
presiding judge in that case.
[Vol. 34
11
Boicourt: Boicourt: Pre-Trial Publicity
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969
COMMENTS
of the Almon case that Blackstone justified the power of the courts to punish for
constructive contempt as one of those summary proceedings necessary to punish
those who would insult or resist the powers of courts. 55
Therefore, as early as the eighteenth century, there was judicial precedent in
England allowing direct sanction against the news media when it interfered with
judicial processes. Since that time newspapers and other segments of the news
media in England have refrained from pre-trial comment. It is the aggrieved
party who initiates the contempt proceeding in England, and not the court.
In determining whether to cite a member of the news media for contempt, the
English courts use a "reasonable tendency test" analogous to the United States
treatment of freedom of expression before the advent of the "clear and present
danger" test. The question is whether the publication "tended to prejudice either
the mind of the judge or any other person who would have to consider the
case," and, if so, "then it is a publication that ought not to be allowed."N6
Traditionally, intent to do prejudice has also been a requirement.57 However,
contempt citations have often been upheld in the apparent absence of intent,
so that in 1960 the Administration of Justice Act5S provided that a reporter was
safe who took reasonable care to assure that no criminal litigation is pending
against a person before causing his comments on said person to be published or
broadcast.
C. History of Contempt by Publication in the United States
The utilization of constructive contempt against the news media is not un-
known in the United States. To the contrary, contempt by publication was, at one
time, practiced according to a "reasonable tendency" test identical to the standard
used in Great Britain. These earlier cases are typified by Patterson v. Colorado5 9
where the United States Supreme Court held that if a publication tended to in-
terfere with the administration of law, the court could punish its publisher via
a contempt citation. A contempt citation was upheld in Toledo Newspaper Co. v.
United States,60 even though the punishing authority did not consider if the
administration of justice was actually hindered. The decision in the Toledo News-
paper case did not require any geographical proximity between the court and the
offending publication; only a causal relationship was necessary.61 This portion of
that opinion was overruled by Nye v. United States62 which held that geographical
proximity was required.6 3
55. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 280-284 (1765).
56. In re Pall Mall Gazette Jones v. Flower Hopkinson, 11 T. L. R. 122
(1894).
57. Rex v. Payne, 1 Q.B. 577 (1896).
58. 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, §§ 11-13 (1960).
59. 205 U.S. 454 (1906).
60. 247 U.S. 402, 421 (1918).
61. Id. at 418-19.
62. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
63. This issue was raised as the result of the "so near thereto" provision of
the certain applicable contempt statutes. See Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487.
Section 268 of that act provides "that such powers to punish for contempts
1969]
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The early liberal trend in the allowance of contempt by publication citations
was sharply reversed by a line of cases in the 1940's which are still considered con-
trolling.04 In Bridges v. California65 the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
of a labor leader for contempt of a state court based on his publication in the
press of a telegram which he had sent to the Secretary of Labor. In this telegram
he sharply criticized a judicial decision involving a labor dispute, and warned that
enforcement of the decree might result in a strike. The Court held that a
constructive contempt conviction, unless the publication acted against created a
"clear and present danger" to the administration of justice, violates the constitu-
tional rights of freedom of speech and press.6
Pennekamp v. Florida67 also relied on the "dear and present danger" test.
There, editorials and cartoons in the Miami Herald criticized the local courts in
general, and specific trial judges in particular, of being overly lenient to criminals.
The general impression conveyed was that the people were not being properly
represented because of the courts' sympathy with criminal defendants. The paper
was cited for contempt. The Supreme Court held these articles did not present a
"clear and present danger" to the administration of justice because they would
not tend to influence the result in a particular case.68 The Court in Pennekamp
also mentioned the fact that one reason the publications did not create a "dear
and present danger" was that the litigation concerned was nonjury.69
In both Bridges and Pennekamp, Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the
implementation of such an absolute formula as the "clear and present danger"
test. He stated his conviction that a balancing approach should be implemented
to determine whether the State Court went beyond the allowable limits
of judgment in holding that conduct which has been punished as a con-
tempt was reasonably calculated to endanger a State's duty to administer
impartial justice in a pending controversy.7 0
The next important case in this area was Craig v. Harney.71 In this case a
Corpus Christi publication commented on a particular decision by a specific judge
stating, as its purpose, to convince the judge to change his mind. Again the
Supreme Court implemented the "clear and present danger" rule to reverse a
contempt conviction, and took special care to stress the requirement of an im-
mediate danger.72
By 1950, the Court seemed set in its position on contempt by publication and
shall not be construed to extend to any case except the misbehavior of any person
in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of Justice."
64. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
65. 314 U.S. 252, 275 (1941).
66. Id. at 278.
67. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
68. Id. at 347.
69. Id. at 348-49.
70. Id. at 354.
71. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
72. Id. at 376.
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it refused to review a case presenting the issue of the use of the contempt power
to stop the press from disseminating prejudicial pre-trial publicity.73 In an
excellent opinion in opposition to denial of certiorari by the Court, Justice
Frankfurter defended the contempt by publication principle. He also stressed
that denial of certiorari did not necessarily mean an affirmance of the state
supreme court decision reversing the contempt conviction.74
The "clear and present danger" test has been partially reaffirmed as applied
to a constructive contempt conviction in the 1962 case of Wood v. Georgia.75
There a sheriff issued a written news release to the press sharply criticising the
actions of a judge as attempting judicially to intimidate negro voters. The
sheriff, rather than the press, was charged with contempt. The Supreme Court
reversed his contempt conviction relying, to a certain degree, on the decisions
discussed above. However, the court retreated from strict "clear and present
danger" language somewhat by holding that the release did not present any
danger to the administration of justice.
On their face, then, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court related
to contempt by publication would seem to minimize the effectiveness of direct
sanctions against the press to relieve prejudicial pre-trial publicity. However,
contempt by publication has never been ruled per se unconstitutional. Evidently,
"if a publication ever involved a "clear and present danger" to the administration
of justice, it would be held in contempt. It should be noted, however, that in all
the cases decided by the Supreme Court on this subject since 1941, the publications
concerned criticisms of past actions by judges, and were not clearly aimed at
present or future litigation. A correlating factor is that none have dealt with the
prospective contamination of jurors by pre-trial publicity. Perhaps publicity that
might not affect a judge could possibly influence a jury, thus constituting a "clear
and present danger" to the administration of justice. Pennekamp v. Florida
might be interpreted to suggest such a conclusion.76
D. Constructive Contempt as a Remedy to Pre-trial
Publicity in the United States Today
1. Obstacles
The most obvious obstacle to the use of constructive contempt is the
judicial precedent created by the decisions outlined above, which have often
struck down contempt convictions. The argument can be made that the validity of
these precedents is not impaired as applied to jury proceedings just because they
all concerned nonjury litigation. The procedural safeguards such as voir dire,
court instructions, change of venue, etc., which have already been considered, are
73. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 888 U.S. 912 (1950).
74. Id. at 917-18.
75. 370 U.S. 375 (1962). The distinguishing aspects of this case are discussed
in the text infra.
76. 328 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946). The Court stressed the unlikelihood thatjudges would be influenced by certain publications and expressly mentioned the
lack of a jury.
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not present in the case where the judge is the only one whose prejudice could effect
the outcome. Accepting this line of reasoning, one could come to the conclusion
that publications not presenting a "clear and present danger" to the impartiality
of a nonjury trial would be even less likely to do so in the case of a jury trial
with the aforementioned procedural safeguards. A refutation to such an argument
would be that these procedural safeguards are largely ineffectual devices which
really cannot deal with prejudice.
Another interesting argument is that made by the well known lawyer,
Percy Foreman:
The English injunctive system is not suitable to either our consti-
tutional or judicial tradition. The Supreme Court consistently has been
very sensitive to any attempt through the use of injunctions to muzzle
the press. Moreover, there is probably not the faith in the lower judiciary
'. . in the United States as in England. We have, for the most part, an
elected judiciary, or politically appointed judges for limited terms, and
a much wider variety of standards for members of the bench than exist in
England. Thus, it would seem most unlikely that we would adopt the
English practice.77
The scope of this article does not comprehend a discussion of the deficiencies
of lower courts in the United States. A possible solution to the kind of problem
presented by Mr. Foreman might lie in remedial action similar to the Missouri
Proposed Court Plan providing for the nonpartisan election of all state judges.7 8
Many who oppose the use of contempt by publication in the United States
point to the extremes produced by the British system. It is true that certain
English contempt convictions have appeared overly harsh and apparently unjust.
The contempt power has been used in cases after the litigation had been com-
pleted, where the publisher was ignorant of pending litigation, and even where
a distributor was unaware of the contents of a publication. 70 However, these
critics fail to point out that England does not produce the opposite extremes
such as can be found in certain American cases such as those discussed above.
Also, any use by the United States courts of constructive contempt would be
tempered by our first amendment safeguards and most certainly would not be
based on the "reasonable tendency" test used by the British.
Of course, the strongest argument against the use of a contempt by publication
system in the United States is that direct restraints on the mass media enforced
before criminal litigation would violate the first amendment. This view is repre-
sented very ably by some members of the Supreme Court, who would place the
first amendment in a preferred position, and presume any action which limits it
to be invalid.80 This is also the view espoused by many members of the mass
77. Foreman, A Defense Lawyer's View, 11 ViLL. L. REv. 704, 707 (1966).
78. 23 J. Mo. BAR 341 (1967).
79. Monroe, A Radio and Television Newsman's View, 11 ViLL. L. Rxv. 687,
691 (1966).
80. Douglas, The Public Trial and Free Press, 33 RocKY MT. L. Rlv. 1
(1960); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 865 (1960)
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media.81 This important argument will be discussed further at the end of this
section.
Many members of the mass media, and others who oppose the concept of
contempt by publication, have argued that the media itself is capable of dealing
with the occasional excesses which can occur in news reporting by adopting a
system of internal control via self codes and the like. The following statement of
H. L. Mencken is probably the best answer to such proposals:
Journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine. Essentially, they are
as absurd as would be codes of streetcar conductors, barbers, or public
jobholders. [I]t [ethical control of publication] must be accomplished by
external forces, and through the medium of penalties exteriorly inflicted.8 2
2. Contempt by Publication Proposals
Some suggestions have been made in the area of contempt by publication.
One of the more radical of these was presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts as a proposed statute.8 3 This proposal would allow for a prosecution
for contempt, by the court having jurisdiction over the criminal proceeding
allegedly prejudiced, of any member of the mass media who might "publish or
broadcast, or cause to be published or broadcast, any statement or information
prejudicial to a defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial by jury in a criminal
proceeding." Such a provision leaves a great deal of discretion in the prosecuting
agency, and, as such, might very well be stamped by the present United States
Supreme Court as "void for vagueness." The Massachusetts court refused to
consider if the proposed statute was repugnant to the United States Constitution
but held that it would not violate the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
This writer is of the opinion that the United States Supreme Court would not
uphold the validity of this proposed statute. The statute provides that proof that
the publication did not prejudice the defendant, that it was issued without intent
to do so, or that it is true will, be no defense. Recent Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with freedom of speech and association, however, have required specific
intent.8 4
A better drawn and more limited proposal, and one to which this writer can
subscribe, is that by the American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Fair
Trial and Free Press. The Committee admonishes that the contempt power should
be used cautiously in certain instances:
(a) Against a person who, knowing that a criminal trial by jury is in
progress or that a jury is being selected for such a trial:
81. Lower, The First Amendment Under Attack: A Defense of the People's
Right to Know, 42 NoTE DAmE LAW. 896 (1967). See also number 004 in a series
of publications by the Freedom of Information Center, School of Journalism,
University of Missouri, June, 1967.
82. Quoted in Le Viness, Crime News, 66 U.S.L. Rxv. 370 (1932).
83. Opinion of the Justices, 208 N.E.2d 240 (1965).
84. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
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(i) disseminates by any means of public communication an extra-
judicial statement relating to the defendant or to the issues in the
case that goes beyond the public record of the court in the case,
that is willfully designed by that person to affect the outcome of
the trial and that seriously threatens to have such an effect; or
(ii) makes such a statement intending that it be disseminated by
any means of public communication.8 5
It is obvious that this proposal is much more narrowly drawn than the proposed
Massachusetts statute. It requires intent and actual resulting prejudice with
knowledge of the pending trial proceeding. It is also less vague as to what kind of
statement is to be prohibited.
A number of law review articles have proposed statutes that would make the
premature publication of certain kinds of prejudicial information punishable as
a contempt.80 Perhaps the best of these is by Professor Thomas L. Shaffer.8 7 He
would allow the press access to all levels of the criminal proceeding to a great
degree but would request, via the threat of a contempt citation, that no release of
certain kinds of materials be made until after the trial. He reasons:
The statute would be much more effective, and much less drastic,
than the proposals of the ABA Committee. It should be accompanied by
broadened access to records and hearings in criminal cases; by oppor-
tunities for the press to observe arrest and interrogation procedures;
and by exposure to parties, counsel, and police officers, unfettered by
any official rules.88
Such a policy would satisfy the general public's right to know, and give added
freedom to the mass media to obtain information on crimes. It would require,
however, a delay in its dissemination until after pending criminal litigation. One
criticism which could be leveled at such a proposal is that it is immediately fol-
lowing the crime when the public most demands knowledge of whether our law
enforcement agencies are functioning properly and if they have the criminal
under custody. After the public has been denied information during the extended
periods usually elapsing between arrest and trial, it may no longer be interested
in the details after the litigation is completed.
3. Indications from the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's decision in Wood v. Georgia9 indicates that the Court
probably would not deny the validity of a statute imposing direct restraints on
the press if that statute were properly drawn. In Wood, the last in the line of the
85. This is the form actually adopted by the Board of Governors of the
American Bar Association, 54 A.B.A.J. 351 (1968).
86. Sigourney, Fair Trial and Free Press-A Proposed Solution, 51 MAss. L. Q.
117 (1966); Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-A Study of Prejudicial News
Reporting in Criminal Cases, 56 J. Cmr. L., 166-69 (1965); Will, Free Press v.
Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 197 (1963).
87. Shaffer, Direct Restraint on the Press, 42 NoTt DAnE LAw. 865 (1967).
88. Id. at 876.
89. 370 U.S. 875 (1962).
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contempt cases, the Supreme Court found that the statements made in a press
release, issued by a sheriff, criticizing a judge's charge to a grand jury "did not
present a (any) danger (whatsoever) to the administration of justice. .. 90 The
Court went out of its way to emphasize that neither Bridges,91 Pennekamp,92 nor
Harney93 involved a trial by jury, and distinguished an actual trial from the
grand jury type proceedings dealt with in Wood. This writer is of the opinion
that the language of Wood typifies a movement by the Supreme Court away
from the "clear and present danger" test. Accordingly, a contempt by publication
statute could be upheld.
In recent years the Supreme Court has held that certain kinds of expression
are not protected by the first amendment. These include obscene utterances or
publications,94 incitment to action for the violent overthrow of our government, 95
libelous statements, 96 and incitement to riot.97 Is it not possible, then, that the
same court would find statements which prejudice the right of a criminally
accused to a fair trial also are outside the range of expression protected by the
first amendment? In addition, recent years have seen a decline in the use by the
Supreme Court of the "clear and present danger" approach. This test was applied
to reverse contempt convictions in the 1940's. Beginning with Dennis v. United
States9S in 1951, the Court began the modification of the requirement of
"immediacy." In that case, the majority adopted the test of Judge Learned Hand:
"In each case courts must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger." The Court, at present, usually resorts to a balancing type test in cases
involving curtailment of expression. That is, the personal freedom of expression
is balanced against some legitimate state interest-for example, the interest in
fair and impartial criminal trials.
All of this suggests a tendency not to place freedom of expression in a preferred
position among those protections conferred upon the individual as against the
state. The right to trial by an "impartial jury" guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment to our Constitution is now less likely to be given a subordinate position to
freedom of expression.
This court has not yet decided that the fair administration of justice
must be subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system-
freedom of the press, properly conceived. The court has not yet decided
that, while convictions must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result
because the minds of jurors or potential jurors were poisoned, the prisoner
is constitutionally protected in plying his trade.99
90. Id. at 395.
91. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
92. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
93. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
94. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
95. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
96. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
97. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
98. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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V. RESTICTION OF THE SOURCE
The type of remedy most actively proposed in regard to the problem of
prejudicial pre-trial publicity is in regard to the regulation of the kinds of
information that defense attorneys, prosecutors, and the police can release to
the press. The following quotation from Sheppard v. Maxwell is illustrative.
And it is obvious that the judge should have further sought to
alleviate this problem by imposing control over the statements made to
the news media by counsel, witnesses, and especially the coroner and
police officers. The prosecution repeatedly made evidence available to the
news media which was never offered in the trial. Much of the "evidence"
disseminated in this fashion was clearly inadmissable. The exclusion of
such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news media make
it available to the public. For example, the publicity about Sheppard's
refusal to take a lie detector test came directly from police officers and
the coroner. The story that Sheppard had been called a "Jekyll-Hyde"
personality by his wife was attributed to a prosecution witness. No such
testimony was given. The further report that there was "a 'bombshell wit-
ness' on tap" who would testify as to Sheppard's "fiery" temper could
only have emanated from the prosecution. Moreover, the newspapers
described in detail clues that had been found by the police, but not put
into the record.' 00
Some recommendations in this area have come in the form of proposed legisla-
tion,1 01 court rules,' 02 and guides or codes.' 0 3
There has been a proposed standard of conduct in the release of news stories
for many years in the form of canon 20 of professional ethics which provides
that all public statements of an attorney in regard to pending or anticipated
litigation generally "are to be condemned." 0 4 Unfortunately, the canon has
been of little practical effect. An alleged violation of it has been considered
only once, and that was in a 1938 case where anti-trust lawyers complained about
100. 384 U.S. 333, 360-361 (1966).
101. S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), would have become 18 U.S.C. 1512.
Proposal by Senator Wayne Morse.
102. State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
103. A.B.A. Rep., Statement of Policy Concerning the Release of Informa-
tion by Personnel of the Department of Justice Relating to Criminal Proceedings,
28 C.F.R. 50.2. In addition, see the recommendations of the Judicial Conference
of the United States for federal legislation to make it a criminal contempt,
punishable for fines up to $1,000, for any federal attorneys, FBI agents, or any
oilier employees of the United States, or any defense counsel to make available to
the press the outcome of criminal litigation. Washington Post, Dec. 23, 1964. The
above are only a small example of the proposals in this area.
104. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics 20 (rev. ed. 1956-57), the text of
which follows:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated
litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise preju-
dice the due administration of justice. Generally, they are to be con-
demned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a
statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An
ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the
records and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme cases, it is
better to avoid any ex parte statement.
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press statements issued by the Attorney General of the United States in connec-
tion with the Government's anti-trust activities.1 05
The most publicized, and also the most comprehensive, study in the area of
pre-trial publicity is that by the Reardon Committee for the A.B.A. Perhaps the
major recommendations of this committee were directed toward a revision of
the Canons of Professional Ethics.' 0 6 This proposal specifically sets forth what kinds
of information may be properly disseminated to the news media and forbids the
release of certain other kinds of information. The Reardon Report also pro-
vides for enforcement by "judicial and bar association reprimand or for
suspension from practice and, in more serious cases, for disbarment or punish-
105. American Bar Association, Opinion of Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, 400-403 (1957).
106. From the time of arrest, issuance of an arrest warrant, or the filing
of a complaint, information, or indictment in any criminal matter until
the commencement of trial or disposition without trial, a lawyer associ-
ated with the prosecution or defense shall not release or authorize the
release of any extrajudicial statement, for dissemination by any means
of public communication, relating to that matter and concerning:
1. The prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments, or
other charges of crime), or the character or reputation of the
accused, except that the lawyer may make a factual statement of
the accused's name, age, residence, occupation, and family status,
and if the accused has not been apprehended, a lawyer associated
with the prosecution may release any information necessary to aid
in his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may
present;
2. The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or
statement given by the accused, or the refusal or failure to the
accused to make any statement;
3. The performance of any examinations or tests or the accused's
refusal or failure to submit to an examination or test;
4. The identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses,
except that the lawyer may announce the identity of the victim if
the announcement is not otherwise prohibited by law;
5. The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or a
lesser offense;
6. Any opinion as to the accused's guilt or innocence or as to
the merits of the case or the evidence in the case.
The foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the lawyer
during this period, in the proper discharge of his official or
professional obligations, from announcing the fact and circum-
stances of arrest (including time and place of arrest, resistance,
pursuit, and use of weapons), the identity of the investigating and
arresting officer or agency, and the length of the investigation;
from making an announcement, at the time of seizure of any
physical evidence other than a confession, admission or statement,
which limited to a description of the evidence seized; from
disclosing the nature, substance, or text of the charge, including
a brief description of the offense charged; from quoting or refer-
ring without comment to public records of the court in the case;
from announcing the scheduling or result of any stage in the
Judicial process; from requesting assistance in obtaining evidence;
or from announcing without further comment that the accused
denies the charges made against him.
54 A.B.A.J. 847 (1968).
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ment for contempt of court." The Report also applies similar restrictions to
judicial employees and law enforcement officers, and suggests departmental
sanctions and controls to be applied where appropriate.
The Reardon recommendations, as adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion, have come under fierce attack by members of the news media and some
members of the Bar. The following quotation of a past president of the Associ-
ated Press Managing Editors Association is one of the more cogent critiques on
the restriction of the release of confessions:
Let us suppose that one of the 5,000 persons arrested during the
recent Detroit rioting, after having been warned of all his rights, had
confessed that he was part of a carefully planned, nationwide conspiracy
to start insurrections wherever possible. Should such a confession be
withheld for many months until this man came to trial? Should a Detroit
policeman decide whether it should be made public?
Suppose that Oswald had confessed, or that Ruby had admitted
to being part of a conspiracy. Should these confessions have been
withheld?
Occasionally, guilt or innocence is inescapable and so must be
reported. In a Phoenix suburb last November one Robert Smith, 18,
was seized in a beauty parlor with the bodies of four women and a
baby girl. He told police: "I shot some people. The gun is over there.
I wanted to get known, to get myself a name."
Mr. Reardon's restrictions would have suppressed that statement.1 07
In a preliminary draft to the proposed new Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, under the new proposed canon seven of the A.B.A. providing that "[a]
lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal limited only by his duty to
act within the bounds of the law," the problem of pre-trial publicity is treated
in a supplementary disciplinary rule. Although the language used is slightly
different than that of the final draft of the Reardon Report as quoted previously,
the prospective canon would forbid "a lawyer or law firm associated with the
case" to "make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a rea-
sonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communica-
tion" concerning any of the topics which the Reardon Report would forbid.108
A bill has also been introduced in the Senate which has resulted in debates
filling volumes of committee hearings:
It shall constitute a contempt of court for any employee of the United
States, or for any defendant or his attorney, or the agent of either, to
furnish or make available for publication information not already
properly filed with the court which is reasonably likely to affect the
outcome of any pending criminal litigation, except evidence that has
107. From a speech given by William B. Dickinson to a Third Circuit
Judicial Conference and reported at 44 F. R. D. 57, 99 (1968).
108. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (tent. draft 1969).
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already been admitted at the trial. Such contempt shall be punishable
by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars.109
After examining portions of the hearings on the bill, it would appear to this
writer, in general, that defense attorneys and judges favor such legislation while
prosecutors and police officials, as well as members of the press, tend to disap-
prove.
The rationale of such proposals is obvious. If responsible members of the
various levels of the judicial process refrain from releasing information to the
press, then the press will not print or broadcast prejudicial information, and,
therefore, the prospective juror will be impartial toward the defendant. In prac-
tice, however, it is doubtful that such a remedy would be effective. In all likelihood,
what will result is that the material printed will be based upon inferior news
sources. Such sources are often inaccurate and more prejudicial than official
news releases might be. Such a practice might also encourage individual investi-
gation by members of the news media which is not likely to be as thorough as
police investigation, but which will be the basis for similar types of news
stories. In addition, much of the harm done in cases such as those concerning
Sam Sheppard and Lee Oswald was the result of editorial type comment. Such
publications are not as dependent on the facts as straight news reporting, and
probably would not be effectively curbed by a lack of official news sources.
How would such restrictions on publication be enforced? It might be rela-
tively easy to trace the statements of defense attorneys and defendants, but the
much larger apparatus of prosecuting authorities and police departments would
be more difficult to control. A result which could occur is that the defendant
loses his right to comment on his innocence or to publicly rebut the evidence
while the police and prosecutor can continue to release, albeit indirectly, preju-
dicial information. Another problem which has been suggested is that police dis-
closures reported in the press are an important source of pre-trial discovery
available to the defense. These disclosures would be curbed by such policies as
those proposed in the Reardon Report.110
VI. SIRmAN BIsHARA SiRIiAN AND JAims EARL RAY
The controversy waged over the scope and content of pre-trial publicity has
already produced some beneficial results in the treatment of publicity pursuant to
the trials of Sirhan Bishara Sirhan for the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy and
of James Earl Ray for the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The trial
judges in both cases issued court orders aimed at curbing prejudicial publicity
before and during trial. These orders were aimed at attorneys, police officials,
etc., and were not drawn to impose sanctions directly against the news media.
109. See also Hearings on S. 290 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Right and the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1965) (emphasis
added).
110. Brown, Fair Trial and Free Press: The A.B.A. Recommendations-A
Defense Lawyer's Viewpoint, 18 W. REs. L. Rxv. 1156 (1967).
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Judge Alarcon, who presided at the arraignment of Sirhan, issued an order
forbidding public officials and others connected with the case from disseminating
any information which would tend to impede the right of the accused to a fair
trial. "Swift" contempt of court citations were promised violators."1 ' Except for
improprieties committed by Samuel W. Yorty, Mayor of Los Angeles, in disclosing
the contents of the notebook found in Sirhan's room, the press, police, and at-
torneys involved conducted themselves in the spirit of the Reardon Report and
the Warren Commission criticisms of the excessive publicity attendant to the
assassination of John F. Kennedy."12
The most comprehensive set of orders directed toward curbing pre-trial
publicity to date are those of Criminal Court Judge V. Preston Battle, who was
chosen by lot to preside over the trial of James Earl Ray. In an order dated
July 19, 1968, Judge Battle forbade anyone interested in the case "to take part
in interviews for publicity and from making extrajudicial statements about this
case from this date until such time as a verdict is returned in this case in open
court."'113 In response to a report that there had been violations of his earlier
order, Judge Battle handed down more explicit guidelines on July 30, 1968,
which forbade statements of personal belief as to the defendant's guilt, plans of
declarant relative to trial tactics, names of potential jurors, comments on the
merits of the case or evidence and the credibility of any witness or the acts and
attitude of the accused."14 The court went on to cite specific instances of impro-
priety including: statements by defense attorney Arthur Hanes that the assassina-
tion involved a Communist conspiracy and that Ray's rights were being trampled
in jail; statements of Sheriff Morris as to Ray's demeanor and attitude while in
jail; and, to the extent Attorney General Ramsey Clark was a law enforcement
officer participating in the case, his statement "that there was no evidence of a
conspiracy in the shooting of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr."115 The order intimated
actions against the alleged violations and future violations could be forthcoming.
The Chairman of the Fair Trial-Free Press Legal Advisory Committee of the
American Bar Association (which succeeded the Reardon committee), Judge
Edward J. Devitt, praised the authorities in these two cases as acting "responsibly
and with good judgment" in their approach to publicity in comparison "with
the Roman circus atmosphere surrounding the apprehension and custody of Lee
Harvey Oswald.""16
VII. CONCLUSION
The present awareness of the possibility that the right of a criminally ac-
cused to a fair trial can be obstructed by the effects of certain kinds of pre-trial
111. New York Times, July 11, 1968, at 34, col. 3.
112. For a more complete discussion, see the news analysis article by Sidney
E. Zion, Assassination and Law, New York Times, June 8, 1968, at 13, col. 6.
113. The entire text of this order appears at New York Times, July 20, 1968,
at 11, col. 2.
114. New York Times, July 31, 1968, at 10, col. 1.
115. Ibid.
116. In a speech given to the Minnesota State Bar Association convention and
reported in New York Times, June 8, 1968, at 64, col. 4.
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publicity has resulted in a number of remedial proposals. Some of them may be
very effective, others relatively useless; but the fact of the controversy itself in
this area is likely to produce some limitations on the excesses which occur in
crime reporting. The Supreme Court, at present, is less likely to hold the first
amendment freedom of the press in a preferred position over the defendant's
right to "an impartial jury" than was true during the 1940's and 1950's. The
Court has been called upon to reverse too many convictions where publicity was
a prejudicial factor to be patient of abuses of freedom of speech in this area. It is
likely to enforce and uphold most of the remedial proposals available if used
with discretion.
An all-inclusive plan, such as the one represented by the American Bar Associ-
ation recommendations of the Reardon committee, are needed in the pre-trial
publicity area, more as a preventive than as a penalizing force. Hopefully, with the
use of such guidelines, our judicial system will be able to deal with the problem
without the imposition of external legislative controls.
MICHAEL L. BoIcouRT
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